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ABSTRACT
Network monitoring systems are important for network operators to easily
analyze behavioral trends in flow data. As networks become larger and more
complex, the data becomes more complex with increased size and more
variables. This increase in dimensionality lends itself to tensor-based analysis of
network data as tensors are arbitrarily sized multi-dimensional objects. Tensorbased network monitoring methods have been explored in recent years through
work at Carnegie Mellon University through their algorithm DenseAlert.
DenseAlert identifies events anomalous events in tensors through quick
detection of dense sub-tensors in positive-valued tensors. However, from
experimentation, DenseAlert fails on larger datasets. Drawing from RED Alert,
we developed an algorithm called RED Alert that uses recursive filtering and
expansion to handle anomaly detection in large tensors of positive and negative
valued data. This is done through the use of network parameters that are
structured in a hierarchical fashion. That is, network traffic is first modeled at low
granular data (e.g. host country), and events detected as anomalous in lower
spaces are tracked down to higher granular data (e.g. host IP). The tensors are
built on-the-fly in streaming data, filtering data to only consider the parameters
deemed anomalous in previous granularity levels. RED Alert is showcased on
two network monitoring examples, packet loss detection and botnet detection,
comparing results to DenseAlert. In both cases, RED Alert was able to detect
suspicious events and identify the root cause of the behavior from a sole IP. RED
Alert was developed as part of a greater project, InSight2, that provides several
different network monitoring dashboards to aid network operators. This required
additional development of a tensor library that worked in the context of InSight2
as well as the development of a dashboard that could run the algorithm and
display the results in meaningful ways.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Parts of this thesis have been submitted to ACM Transactions on Knowledge
Discovery from Data as of October 2018. I served as the author of this paper,
additionally conducting the literature survey, developing the algorithm, portraying
and analyzing the results, and writing the journal paper. Other authors, Angel
Kodituwakku, Jens Gregor, and Michael Thomason served as sources of
guidance and advisers to help locate other resources that were beneficial to the
completion of the paper.

1.1 Overview of Network Monitoring
Network flow data is one source of data that can be used to facilitate real-time
network performance monitoring and detection of malicious traffic [1, 2]. Network
flow data is a stream of records that provide further metadata about a transaction
in the network, including labels of actors in a transaction and performance
metrics of each transaction. Due to the amount of flow data produced by even a
moderately active network, automated detection of interesting events is needed
to support the network administrators carry out their work [3]. The large number
of parameters associated with each flow, such as the source and destination host
IP addresses, the number of packets transmitted, lost and retransmitted, and the
protocol and port numbers to mention a few, furthermore implies that the analysis
might benefit from the use of multi-dimensional data representations.
Tensors offer a way to model multi-dimensional data effectively; tensors of order
n are n-dimensional representations of data describing linear relationships [4].
Various algorithms have been developed to analyze patterns within tensors. For
example, generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) is used in genomics
for classification of genes [5]. GSVD has been extended to tensors through the
so-called higher-order GSVD (HOGSVD) [6]. Tensors have also been used
in network analysis for anomaly detection of network packet activity using
Canonical Polyadic (CP) decomposition [7]. Both of these methods project the
data in a new space. In order to relate events to specific parameters and fields, it
may be preferable that the analysis be carried out in the original data space.
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DenseAlert [8] maintains a tensor model of the raw data. Events characterized by
an increase in activity are detected by identifying dense sub-tensors. The
algorithm uses sophisticated methods to carry out the needed computations
quickly. The complex nature of the code makes the algorithm relatively difficult to
implement. The Java implementation provided by the authors moreover builds on
dedicated tensor support code, the efficiency of which may not be matched by a
third-party. Combined, this makes porting the algorithm difficult. In addition,
DenseAlert requires that the data be positive valued which could be a limitation
for some applications. DenseAlert is analyzed and tested in Chapter 2 of this
thesis.
The primary focus of this thesis is the introduction of an algorithm called RED
Alert that uses recursive filtering and expansion to create a hierarchy of subtensors that represent the data at different granularity levels. The idea is to
maintain a coarse-level tensor model that can quickly be updated when new data
becomes available. When the activity being monitored exceeds a user-defined
threshold, relevant sub-tensors are automatically expanded until an alarm can be
raised which provides the most detailed information possible. Granularity is a
refinement to the tensor dimensions. For example, low granularity data might be
host country with high granularity data being the explicit host IP address. This is
explained in more detail in Chapter 3 with some showcase examples.
The data used in this thesis comes from a large research and education (R&E)
network called GLORIAD. The Global Ring Network for Advanced Applications
Development (GLORIAD) was an R&E network aiming to provide a network
infrastructure to connect institutes and universities at a global scale [9].
GLORIAD’s successes can be seen through its ability to connect over 15 million
endpoints and support from the NSF and universities worldwide. GLORIAD led to
the development of a network performance tool called InSight2, a platform for
which the work in this thesis was developed. The inner workings of InSight2 and
the tensor processing infrastructure developed for InSight2 are described in
Chapter 4. Concluding remarks are then provided in Chapter 5.

1.2 Tensor Definitions
Tensors are generalized n-dimensional objects that can provide a means for indepth analysis of multiple parameters. Tensors offer a way to easily model multi2

dimensional data as they can contain an arbitrary number of dimensions. In this
section, the basic tensor definitions and concepts that will be used in the
remainder of this thesis are defined.
Modes: The dimensions of a tensor are referred to as modes. For example, a
vector is a tensor with 1 mode, and a matrix is a tensor with 2 modes. Tensors
can have any number of modes since the dimensionality of a tensor is
unrestricted.
Furthermore, each mode can be indexed as one would expect. In a tensor with 2
modes, element (i, j) corresponds to the value stored in the i th row and the j th
column in the tensor. In this thesis, each mode represents a parameter in a
network flow record.
Sub-tensors: Tensors can be divided into subsets of a tensor by indexing a
subset of the set of viable vertices in the original tensor. For example, suppose 𝑇
is a tensor with 2 modes (i.e., a matrix) and dimensionality 4 × 4. Let 𝑆 be the set
{(4,4), (4,1), (1,4), (1,1)}. Then, 𝑇𝑆 is the sub-tensor of 𝑇 consisting of the first and
fourth rows and columns of 𝑇.
Slices: Another method of dividing tensors (and sub-tensors) is a method called
slicing. Slices are formed by holding one mode constant in the tensor,
representing the various layers of a tensor. For example, consider the same
tensor 𝑇 from the previous example. A slice across mode 1 would represent a
row. A slice across mode 2 would represent a column. Since 𝑇 has dimensions 4
× 4, each mode has 4 possible slices. Figure 1.1 visualizes slices in a tensor of 3
modes [10]. These tensors can be sliced horizontally, laterally, or frontally as
shown in the figure.
Tensor Subtraction: Both tensors and sub-tensors can be subtracted from one
another when the objects contain the same dimensionality. This is useful for
tracking changes in streaming tensors as discussed in the next chapter. This
subtraction is done in an index-wise manner. This means that for two tensors of
mode 3, 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 , the difference 𝑇1 − 𝑇2 would be the difference for each
element at (i, j, k) in 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 for all i, j, k  the dimension set for 𝑇1 and 𝑇2 .
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Figure 1.1: Tensor Slices, Source: [10]

Density: Tensors, sub-tensors, and slices have a density that can be calculated.
Density can be interpreted as a quantified measure of influence created by the
tensor, sub-tensor or slice. In the next chapter about the DenseAlert algorithm,
density of a slice is used as the primary measurement. Density of a tensor 𝑇 can
be defined as
∑(𝑖.𝑗,𝑘) 𝑇(𝑖,𝑗,𝑘)
|𝑇|

,

where (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) are valid indices with 𝑇, and |𝑇| is the number of elements in the
tensor. This equation holds when 𝑇 is a slice or sub-tensor as well. The
summation would sum valid entries where (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) are valid indices for the slice or
sub-tensor.
Change: Total change of a sub-tensor or a slice is defined as the sum of the
element-wise absolute valued differences of two such entities. For two tensors,
𝑇1 and 𝑇2 , total change is defined as
∑(𝑖,𝑗,𝑘)|𝑇1 (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) − 𝑇2 (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘)|,
for all valid indices (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) in the tensors. Total change serves as the main metric
used in the RED Alert algorithm described in Chapter 3. The slice in a tensor with
the most change is detected in RED Alert, indicating anomalous activity.
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Total change is inspired from the concept of total variation in Calculus. Total
change is described by the equation
𝑏

∫𝑎 |𝑓 ′ (𝑥)|𝑑𝑥,

which calculates the arc length of a differentiable function, f(x) for a given interval
[a, b]. This equation can be represented as
𝑏

∑|𝑓(𝑖) − 𝑓(𝑖 − 1)|,
𝑖=𝑎

which is similar to the definition of total change defined above.
Energy: Energy can be defined as the sum of the squares of the norms for a
given sequence, normalized by the number of elements in this sequence [11].
Energy has been used to estimate the number of principal components needed
through thresholding [11], but we use energy as an anomaly detection measure.
In the context of our tensors, define energy can be defined as the squared
Frobenius norm [12] for a given tensor, sub-tensor, or slice, divided by the
number of non-zero entries. That is, for indices (𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) in tensor 𝑇 , we calculate
the energy as
∑(𝑖,𝑗,𝑘)|𝑇(𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘)|2
|𝑇|

,

where |𝑇| is the number of non-zero components. In the context of slices or subtensors, the equation holds, but instead the equation only iterates on indices
(𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘) for the slice or sub-tensor. Energy is used as a supplemental
measurement for the anomaly detections in RED Alert. Just as the slice with
maximum change is detected, the slice with the highest energy in the tensor
representing total change can also be detected to indicate anomalous activity.
Total change and energy can be considered as the L1-norm and L2-norm for the
change tensor. Total change is the L1-norm as it considers the values of the
tensor in linear space, and energy is the L2-norm as it considers the tensor in
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quadratic space. The Frobenius norm is equivalent to the Euclidean norm
typically used for L2-norms [12].
Streaming Tensors: Since network flow data can be viewed as a continuous
stream of data, in this thesis, dynamic streaming tensors are used instead of
static tensors of fixed dimensionality. Streaming tensors are a sequence of
tensors aggregated into a single tensor for a fixed time. This allows for data to
only be considered for a specific time window, and old data can be discarded as
new tensor streams come in. This concept will be touched on throughout this
thesis.

1.3 Problem Motivation
We were given access to several terabytes of GLORIAD’s network flow data to
develop network analysis tools. Using Argus [13] as a network flow aggregator,
over 40 different fields describing the network flow data could be extracted.
Examples of such fields include bytes per transaction, number of packets per
transaction, and packets lost. Additionally, online databases were used to gather
additional metadata about geolocation of the flow data. This is useful since
GLORIAD was a global network, so understanding how the network functioned in
different regions is essential for network monitoring. Varying levels of metadata
were gathered about each transaction from these online databases. This
includes country, city, and institution name for each IP discovered from the flow
data. This primary focus of this thesis is exploring how performance at these
varying levels of metadata, referred to as granularity levels, can be tracked and
explored to find anomalous trends within the data.
Although network monitoring can be conducted from varying perspectives, the
primary focus of this thesis is in the context of performance monitoring through
packet loss detection and security monitoring through botnet activity detection.
These two problems are described in this section.
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1.3.1 Performance Monitoring
One important aspect of network performance is minimizing the number of
packets lost per transaction. With each packet lost, network users either must refetch the request to obtain the lost data or suffice with incomplete data. Large
amounts of packet loss indicate potential issues in network infrastructure that
warrant investigation. Thus, one focus of this thesis is detection times of high
packet loss within GLORIAD. This can be detected by building tensors of the
number of packets lost between a given source and destination connection.
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 provide heat maps of packet losses during an 11-hour time
period for a select subset of source and destination countries. Dark cells indicate
low losses while bright cells indicate large amounts of packet loss. Figure 1.4
plots the corresponding percent of packets lost overall. The goal is to detect the
high loss events and determine whether they can be attributed to many hosts, in
which case they may indicate a general network problem, or if they are specific to
a small number of identifiable hosts, in which case the problem likely has to do
with the specific hosts. In Figure 1.4, the sudden increase in packet loss around
14:30 is one of primary interest explored in this thesis. Throughout the thesis, the
events marked in green circles in the figures represent anomalous events that
could be detected.

1.3.2 Security Monitoring
Botnets consist of a collection of compromised hosts which are used to
carry out network attacks including but not limited to stealing data, sending spam,
and performing distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) [14]. As these attacks can
greatly affect the well-being of a network and its hosts (not to mention the users),
it is important to discover when botnets are active. Because of this, another focus
of this thesis considers analyzing network flow data from a security perspective
to detect botnets in large networks.
Typical botnet behavior includes sudden broadcasting of connections after being
dormant for some time. This lends itself to detection by considering the number
of connections from a given source to a destination in a specific time window.
This way, a sudden increase in connections can be detected as the values in this
tensor will change drastically in a short period of time.
7

Figure 1.2: Source Traffic Heatmap, Packet Loss

Figure 1.3: Destination Traffic Heatmap, Packet Loss

Figure 1.4: Total Packets Lost for Large Network
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Figures 1.5 and 1.6 provide heat maps of the number of connections made per
source and destination during an 11-hour period for a select subset of countries.
Dark cells indicate few connections while bright cells indicate many connections.
Figure 1.7 plots the number of known botnet hosts active during the same time
period. The term “known botnet host” refers to IP addresses labeled as
compromised in the Zeus [15], Palevo [16], and Feodo [17] botnet databases. As
seen in the figures, the large increase in botnet activity around 9:00 corresponds
to the large increase in network activity from Russia to the Netherlands.
In the next two chapters of this thesis, both DenseAlert and RED Alert process
these two datasets of packet loss and number of connections to attempt to detect
the performance and security anomalies. These algorithms use completely
different methodologies and evaluation metrics, providing varying results. Again,
the primary goal in these detections is the ability to be able to detect the
anomalous behavior at any level of metadata (country, city, institution, or IP).
That is, the spikes seen in Figures 1.4 and 1.7 should be detected independent
of the labels given in the tensor. DenseAlert fails to recognize spikes using IP
labels, which led to the development of RED Alert, an algorithm that can detect
anomalous behavior regardless of level of metadata through recursive filtering
and expansion.
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Figure 1.5: Source Traffic Heatmap, Number of Connections

Figure 1.6: Destination Traffic Heatmap, Number of Connections

Figure 1.7: Total Number of Botnet Connections for Large Network
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2. NETWORK ANOMALY DETECTION THROUGH DENSEALERT
One recently developed algorithm that showcases botnet detection in network
data using tensors is DenseAlert [8]. This algorithm uses the concept of density
to maintain the densest sub-tensor of a streaming tensor to detect sudden
changes, reporting them as anomalous. The DenseAlert paper showcases the
algorithm on a number of anomaly detection uses, including Yelp spam reviews,
Wikipedia edit wars, and the botnet detection. Thus, it would seem that
DenseAlert would be a suitable algorithm to use for our analyses of large-scale
network traffic data. However, some problems arose when using DenseAlert with
larger tensors. This chapter describes DenseAlert’s algorithm and demonstrates
the shortcomings of the algorithm for GLORIAD data in the context of the
performance and security monitoring problems.

2.1 DenseAlert Overview
DenseAlert is an algorithm that claims to be “fast and any time,” “provably
accurate,” and “effective” [8]. This is done through the maintenance of a tensor
consisting of entries that represent the increment or decrement values in a tensor
for a given time window. This means that DenseAlert does not actually maintain
an entire tensor; rather it tracks multi-dimensional streaming data for increments
or decrements to values in the tensor. The idea is that a sudden change in the
maintained dense sub-tensor should indicate anomalous activity. This section
describes this algorithm in detail and provides some analyses of the algorithm.
Although DenseAlert works for static and streaming data, we focused on the
streaming implementation of the algorithm due to the use of network flow data.

2.1.1 DenseAlert Algorithm
DenseAlert’s main goal is to detect suddenly appearing dense sub-tensors within
streaming or static tensors, which indicates anomalous activity. This is done by
projecting a sequence of data streams into a tensor space and performing a
series of re-orderings and calculations to maintain the densest block. The
algorithm does not actually calculate the exact densest sub-tensor as that is
11

computationally expensive, taking high powers of polynomial time [18]. Instead,
the algorithm estimates the densest sub-tensor with provable confidence to quell
the large polynomial time.
DenseAlert uses a variety of concepts and notations throughout its description of
the algorithm. The most important component of DenseAlert is their idea of “DOrdering.” This idea is what provides significant speedup to DenseAlert
compared to its competitors. A D-Ordering is obtained by repeatedly re-ordering
slice indices so that the slice with the minimum sum is chosen first. That is, when
a slice s is chosen for the D-Ordering, the slice index is added to the D-Ordering,
and all elements from s are removed from the tensor. The process is then
repeated until all slices appear in the D-Ordering. The paper claims that using DOrdering reduces the search time for finding the densest sub-tensor.
The DenseAlert algorithm works as follows. Every T time ticks, the change for a
given tensor is calculated by finding the difference between the tensor of the
previous time window and the current time window. For each value in the tensor
that changed, DenseAlert performs re-ordering and updating based on whether
there was an increase or decrease in the value. The first iteration of the algorithm
compares the current tensor against the zero tensor of the same size, meaning
the first iteration will always be the case of increment.
In the case of an increment in a tensor value, DenseAlert first finds a region that
needs to be re-ordered by the definition of D-Ordering. Anything outside of this
region can be left alone as the paper guarantees that the D-Ordering will be
maintained after the detected region is updated. Once this region is found, the
reordering of the calculated region is conducted to maintain the D-Ordering, and
the slice sum of this region is saved. After the re-ordering, the dense sub-tensor
needs to be updated. To do this, first the slice sum calculated by the D-Ordering
is compared to the densest sub-tensor density from the previous tensor. If the
maximum slice sum is less than the sub-tensor density, the paper proves that the
densest sub-tensor is guaranteed to not need updating. Otherwise, DenseAlert
recalculates the dense sub-tensor, updating it if it has changed. After this,
DenseAlert is done with the re-ordering and updating. However, the algorithm
then schedules a decrement to this tensor value at the next T time. This is done
to undo the increment to the value experienced here and return the tensor back
to its prior state in case of sudden and sharp increases.
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In the case of a decrement in a tensor value, the algorithm again finds a region
that needs to be re-ordered and re-orders the region to meet the D-Ordering
definition. This region is determined in a slightly different fashion than in the case
of an increment, but the idea is the same – re-order the region so that D-Ordering
is maintained. Again, after the re-order process is completed, DenseAlert checks
to see if the densest sub-tensor needs to be updated. Instead of comparing the
maximum slice sum as done in the case of an increment, DenseAlert checks if
the decremented tensor value is in the densest sub-tensor. If the value is a part
of this region, the densest sub-tensor is updated if it has changed. If the tensor
value is not in the densest sub-tensor, the authors guarantee that the sub-tensor
would be unaffected and, thus, does not need to be updated. Unlike in the case
of increment, DenseAlert does not schedule any event in the case of
decrements.
In both the case of the increment and decrement, the density of the densest subtensor is returned. As seen in the results section, spikes in the density of this
region typically correspond to anomalies in the data.

2.1.2 DenseAlert Analysis
DenseAlert has time complexity O(S + RlogR) plus some relatively small time for
other operations such as calculating slice sums and searching for slices. In this,
S is the number of slices in the tensor, and R is the number of slices in the reordered region. The O(S) time is due to the search for slices forming the dense
sub-tensor, and the O(RlogR) time is from the re-ordering of the tensor to meet
the requirements of D-Ordering. DenseAlert uses a Fibonnaci heap to search for
the minimum slices in the re-ordering leading to this linear logarithmic time
complexity. Otherwise, the search would be exponential as the search space
requires updating as each slice is re-ordered. Through plots shown in the
DenseAlert paper, the algorithm is unarguably much faster than its competitors.
The algorithm described previously is a summary of DenseAlert, and the inner
workings of the algorithm are complicated and require a detailed code base.
Their tensor implementation alone consists of over 600 lines of code, and the
actual DenseAlert algorithm requires over 1700 lines of code. The code uses
sparse tensor implementations to lead to a small space complexity that is linearly
proportional to the number of non-zero values stored in the tensor. That is, for N
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non-zero values in the tensor, the space complexity is O(N). This makes
understanding and porting the algorithm to other frameworks cumbersome for
those who cannot work in the Java framework provided by the authors and do
not have the resources to create such a detailed code base for their own
implementation. Without a dedicated code base, implementing re-orders and
searching of large multi-dimensional objects is costly.
The paper showcases DenseAlert on a variety of datasets. These datasets
include Yelp, Android, and Yahoo reviews for detecting fake reviews, Wikipedia
edit history for detecting edit wars, bots or vandals, and social networks for spam
detection. The paper also shows successful detection of botnets in TCP dump
data where the dimensions were source IP × destination IP × timestamp, with
values within the tensor being the number of connections. This would indicate
that DenseAlert would be a suitable algorithm to use for our network data. In the
next section, some shortcomings of DenseAlert are shown in the context of
network data.

2.2 DenseAlert Results
In network anomaly detection, it is important to discover the root cause of the
anomaly. Network operators rely on detailed information properly diagnose and
solve the root cause of an issue. Since flow data has varying levels of granularity,
it is important to be able to determine the cause of anomalies regardless of the
level of network data being observed. For example, a time of large network
performance issues should be able to be determined from a coarse perspective
of country to country traffic and at a fine perspective of host IP to host IP traffic.
This way, a network operator can understand if an issue is widespread across a
region or fault for a specific IP. The DenseAlert algorithm is stated to work for
large datasets, but in some cases DenseAlert fails to detect any anomalies and
returns unhelpful and noisy results. This section shows the results of DenseAlert
when attempting to process datasets of varying sizes, demonstrating some
potential issues when using DenseAlert. To do this, minor modifications were
made to the DenseAlert example code (https://github.com/kijungs/densealert) in
order to work with our data. In both examples, a time window of 1 minute was
used.
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2.2.1 Packet Loss Detection
Although DenseAlert’s network monitoring example focused on botnet detection,
the algorithm could be used on any type of positive-valued data. Since number of
packets lost consists of positive values, DenseAlert should be able to detect
sudden increases packets lost. The GLORIAD data was aggregated into a CSV
file representing a tensor to be read by DenseAlert. The tensor itself consisted of
dimensions source information × destination information × time (in second
increments) where the source information and destination information varied in
granularity level (country, city, institution, or IP). The values within the tensor
were the number of packets lost for that connection, summed by seconds.
DenseAlert was run on tensors from the four different granularity levels to see if it
could detect the large increase in packet loss regardless of tensor size and
labels.
With reference to Figures 2.1 – 2.4, DenseAlert is able to detect the major spike
in packet loss around 14:45, but as the granularity levels become finer, the
reported densities slowly begin to have more variation until the algorithm
completely fails at the IP granularity level. The country level detection (Figure
2.1) provides the most descriptive results where the large spike is clearly defined
with relatively consistent densities otherwise. At the city level (Figure 2.2), the
large spike is still seen, but the algorithm reports more variation in the densities,
notably between 10:30 and 12:30 as well as 15:00 to 17:00. This seems to
indicate anomalous activity with the sudden and frequent changes in the
densities, but according to the ground truth, the number of packets lost at this
time is rather constant. A similar variation in the densities can be seen at the city
level (Figure 2.3). Finally, at the IP level (Figure 2.4), the algorithm falls apart and
reports noisy densities that provide absolutely no correlation to the data. The
densities at this level are also about 5 magnitudes smaller than the densities
reported at the country, city, and institution levels. If kept plotting using the same
y-axis scale as the first 3 plots, the densities in Figure 2.4 would be unnoticeable
due to the size of their magnitudes.
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Figure 2.1: DenseAlert Packet Loss, Country Data

Figure 2.2: DenseAlert Packet Loss, City Data

Figure 2.3: DenseAlert, Packet Loss, Institution Data
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Figure 2.4: DenseAlert Packet Loss, IP Data

2.2.2 Botnet Detection
In its debut paper, DenseAlert is showcased on a botnet detection example. As
proposed in the paper, a CSV file containing number of connections in GLORIAD
was aggregated and processed by DenseAlert for detection of increases in
botnet activity. With reference to Figures 2.5 – 2.8, DenseAlert is again able to
detect the botnet activity at the country, city, and institution granularity levels, but
fails at the IP granularity level. As seen in the packet loss example, the decline in
performance is gradual through the increasing granularity levels. The densities
once again slowly become noisier in each subsequent level until nothing useful is
returned at the IP granularity level. DenseAlert also only detects the major spike
seen around 9:00 but misses the two spikes seen around 13:00 and 15:00.
Nothing in the DenseAlert paper points to why the algorithm would fail on the IP
level dataset in both cases. The IP level dataset consists of 4.7 million non-zero
entries for the packet loss example and 7.4 million non-zero entries for the botnet
example. The DenseAlert paper shows results from datasets containing up to
82.8 million non-zero entries. Similarly, the dimensionalities of the datasets are of
sizes DenseAlert should be able to handle. It seems that the size of these
datasets leads to the algorithm’s failures. Since DenseAlert works on the smaller
datasets of lower granularity and slowly performs worse as the datasets become
larger and finer, the most reasonable explanation for the decline in performance
would be the increases in granularity.
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Figure 2.5: DenseAlert Botnet, Country Data

Figure 2.6: DenseAlert Botnet, City Data

Figure 2.7: DenseAlert Botnet, Institution Data
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Figure 2.8: DenseAlert Botnet, IP Data
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3. REDALERT: RECURSIVE EVENT DETECTION
As seen in the previous chapter, DenseAlert fails to recognize anomalous activity
for large datasets using IP address labels. Because of this, we created an
algorithm called RED Alert to attempt to improve on the shortcomings of
DenseAlert. RED (Recursive Event Detection) Alert uses recursive tensor
expansion and exploration to detect and classify anomalous network behavior.
The algorithm tracks anomalies detected at a high granularity level down to the
lowest granularity level, discarding unimportant data. This chapter introduces
RED Alert’s main algorithm, analyses of the time and space effects of the
algorithm, and some case studies used to showcase RED Alert.

3.1 Algorithm Overview and Analysis
RED Alert finds the most changed slice in a sub-tensor by the total change or
energy measures outlined previously. The algorithm works recursively in that
when high change spikes are detected, the algorithm finds the most changed
slice in the next finer level of granularity after filtering the data. This section
explains the primary steps of RED Alert as well as some analyses of the
algorithm’s runtime and space complexity.

3.1.1 Granularity and Filtering
For the source and destination parameters, different levels of granularity are
used to explore the root cause of density spikes. Granularity organizes different
levels of metadata in a hierarchical fashion. In our implementation, the lowest
granularity level is the host country with a maximum of about 200 fields. The next
two levels of granularity are city and institution, respectively with about 10,000
and 35,000 fields. Institution is considered a finer granularity than city since
multiple institutions may exist in one city. The finest granularity is the host IP
addresses, having a magnitude of over 100 million fields in hours of data. Figure
3.1 shows the four granularity levels used in RED Alert. Additionally, the
granularities outlined are not finite. More levels could potentially be included if the
labels exist in a dataset. The labels obtained for country, city and institution were
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gathered using online databases that map IP addresses to these fields. Fields
such as port number that can be included in the tensor data do not undergo the
recursive filtering as no varying levels of metadata exists for these types of fields.
To separate fields with the same name (i.e. same city name, different country, or
same institution, different location), field names are appended together to as the
granularity levels become finer. For example, a city is labeled as “country.city”,
and an institution is labeled as “country.city.institution.” This avoids any labeling
different places with the same name at a level as the same label. IP address
labels are solely the IP address since only one instance of an IP address can
exist.
A coarse granularity tensor is, by nature, small. Finding the densest sub-tensor
slice(s) therefore takes relatively little time. In an attempt to keep the search time
low in the finer granularity tensors, the data is filtered prior to being expanded.
Filtering consists of discarding all but the densest sub-tensor slice(s) from further
consideration.

Figure 3.1: Default Granularity Levels
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3.1.2 RED Alert Algorithm
Rather than building a detailed tensor model for the data at the fine granularity
level ultimately of interest, RED Alert initially models the data at a coarse
granularity level, moving to finer granularity spaces as needed. The RED Alert
algorithm works as follows. With reference to Figure 3.2, every N time ticks, a
tensor is created by aggregating the network flow data captured during that time
period. This tensor is created for the coarsest granularity level of country. Then,
the tensor is compared against the tensor for the previous time period. That is,
the difference between the two tensors is computed and passed to the function
described in Figure 3.3 that finds and returns a list of (mode, index)-pairs
identifying the slices that have a total change value approximately as much as
the most changed slice. The search is based on change magnitudes to allow
negative change values, which correspond to decreases in network activity, to be
detected on par with positive change values, which correspond to increases in
network activity.
If the change magnitude exceeds a user-defined threshold, then a recursive
search is carried out, during which copies of the original tensors and extracted
sub-tensors are filtered and expanded as described in the previous section.
Again, (mode, index)-pairs that do not exceed the threshold are ignored whereas
the (mode, index)-pairs returned are expanded to consider the next level of
granularity. For example, if the maximum (mode, index)-pairs returned were
(source country, United States) and (destination country, Canada), then the
tensor of the next granularity would be one of city to city traffic consisting only of
data from the United States to Canada.
Thresholds vary based on granularity, so that false alarms can be canceled at a
finer granularity. That is, as each maximum change value is calculated, it is
compared against the threshold at the given granularity level to see if the filtering
and expansion should continue or be terminated. When the recursive search
reaches the final level and terminates, an alarm is raised an information is shared
with the user about the event. A modified version of RED Alert might use the sign
of the maximum to raise alarms on positive values and clear alarms on negative
values when the traffic returns to normal.
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Figure 3.2: RED Alert Algorithm

Figure 3.3: Finding Maximum Change
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RED Alert differs significantly from DenseAlert. RED Alert finds the tensor slice
for which the change is the greatest. DenseAlert, on the other hand, maintains
and detects suddenly emerging dense sub-tensors using sophisticated reordering techniques. RED Alert can handle positive and negative valued data.
DenseAlert requires that the data be positive valued. RED Alert only expands the
data to the finest granularity level when need be. DenseAlert stores data and
carries out all analysis at the finest granularity level which involves large tensors.

3.1.3 Time and Space Complexity
RED Alert with no optimizations is able to run and process data in real-time. This
section provides time and space analyses of RED Alert for each of the major
components of the algorithm.
Tensor Creation: Creating a tensor takes O(N) time for N non-zero entries in the
tensor. This creation is independent of dimensionality used since each non-zero
value will need to be processed regardless of the dimensionality. Likewise,
tensor creation cannot be sped up since the values again must all be processed
and assigned an index. The tensor creation process will be explained more
deeply in the next chapter in the context of InSight2.
Computing Total Change and Energy: For N non-zero entries in a tensor,
computing the total change and energy for the tensor takes O(N) time. This is
because each of the N non-zero entries must be subtracted (in the case of total
change) and additionally squared and summed (in the case the of energy).
Unfortunately, there are no speed-ups to make multi-dimensional
addition/subtraction quicker.
Finding Max Anomalous Slice: Finding the maximum change or energy for a
tensor takes O(S) time for S total slices in a tensor, 𝑆 = ∑𝑑 ∈𝐷 𝑑, where D is the
dimensionality of the tensor. For example, for a tensor with dimensions a × b × c,
S = a + b + c. This process cannot be sped up since finding the maximum value
in a list of values always takes linear time for an unsorted list. Sorting the list of
changes and then finding the maximum change would take O(SlogS) time, longer
than the original linear time.
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The overall time complexity of RED Alert is O(N + S) since for each iteration of
the algorithm, the N non-zero value differences must first be accumulated and
calculated, O(N) time. This is followed by the detection of maximum slice, taking
O(S) time. RED Alert runs in strictly linear time, and DenseAlert runs in log-linear
time. However, DenseAlert’s leading big-O coefficient, RlogR, is much smaller
than N + S. R, the re-order region, consists of a subset of S and guaranteed to
be much smaller than S. In turn, S is a subset of N, and guaranteed to be much
smaller than N. Because of this, RED Alert’s linear time complexity is a bit
misleading when compared to DenseAlert. The latter algorithm is in fact faster
since it only ever considers a subset of the entire tensor.
RED Alert Space Complexity: If stored directly without any improvements,
storage of a tensor takes a maximum of O(M) for 𝑀 = ∏𝑑 ∈𝐷 𝑑, where D is the
dimensionality of the tensor. This product can be exponentially large as the
dimensionality increases. The tensors typically used are sparse, so sparse tensor
representations are often useful to reduce the space complexity. RED Alert uses
a sparse tensor representation called COO format, discussed in detail in the next
chapter. For N non-zero entries and d dimensions, sparse tensor storage in COO
format only requires O(N + Nd) space. This is because in COO format, only a list
of the N non-zero values and a list of each non-zero value’s index (Nd total
space) is stored. This has a tradeoff of increasing time complexity of accessing
each slice as the index list must be searched to find all entries in a specific slice.
That is, to find all elements in slice S of the tensor, it takes O(Nd) time to locate
all values for that slice since the entire index list must be searched. Although this
may seem long, the sizes of tensors used in RED Alert are large and sparse, so
sparse tensor representations are needed. Thus, the increased time complexity
is necessary to be able to hold the data in memory.
Other than tensors, RED Alert uses constant memory to store temporary
variables and constants. From this, the overall space complexity of RED Alert
(assuming sparse tensor storage) is O(N + Nd), which is equivalent to O(N). RED
Alert and DenseAlert have the same space complexity through the use of sparse
tensor implementations in both algorithms.
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3.2 RED Alert Results
RED Alert is able to detect and identify anomalous behavior from both a security
and network performance standpoint. The results of these detections are shown
in this section using both total change and energy. This section also explores the
parameters of RED Alert, time window and threshold values, and provides a look
at the robustness of the algorithm in terms of processing for long periods of time.

3.2.1 Packet Loss Detection
As done in the DenseAlert example, a tensor consisting of packet loss values
between a source and destination at a given time (3-mode tensor) was used for
the packet loss detection through RED Alert. Again, a time window of 1 minute
was used, so each minute, the streaming tensor was aggregated and compared
to the tensor corresponding to the previous minute. The results of running RED
Alert can be seen in Figures 3.4 – 3.7 in order to attempt the packet loss
detection from Figure 1.4
RED Alert uses its recursive filtering and expansion to detect a spike in packet
loss at the country granularity level and trace it down all the way to the IP
granularity level. Looking at Figure 3.4, the major spike around 14:30 is visible
among other noise in the data. Using a threshold of 3000 at this level, 111 events
were detected (shown through the red X’s in the figure). These 111 events were
then expanded to focus on city to city traffic, shown in Figure 3.5. Once again,
the major spike was detected and alerted on, along with 29 other events, at the
city granularity level using a threshold of 3500. This removed 81 insignificant
events that were triggered at the country granularity level, saving computational
time. Then at the institution granularity level, only 7 events were alerted with a
threshold of 4000 as seen in Figure 3.6. Finally, only 5 events were alerted at the
IP granularity from a threshold of 5000, shown in Figure 3.7. These events
corresponded to the major spike in packet loss seen in Figure 1.4, shown
through the green circle in Figure 3.7. At this level, the algorithm reported the IP
addresses experiencing the extreme packet loss. In this case, a destination IP
identified was one losing 40% of its packets through over 1000 connections in
the time window. This indicates potential performance issues that warrants
investigation.
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Figure 3.4: RED Alert Packet Loss, Country Granularity

Figure 3.5: RED Alert Packet Loss, City Granularity

Figure 3.6: RED Alert Packet Loss, Institution Granularity

27

Figure 3.7: RED Alert Packet Loss, IP Granularity

3.2.2 Botnet Detection
Again, RED Alert ran through the same tensor passed to DenseAlert in its botnet
detection. This consisted of a time × source × destination tensor with number of
connections as its value. As shown in Figures 3.8 – 3.11, RED Alert is able to
detect periods of high botnet activity at the country, city, institution, and IP
granularity levels. At each transition to a finer level, uninteresting data is removed
by the filtering process. 130 events were identified as being of interest at the
country level (threshold of 1000), followed by 46 events at the city level
(threshold of 1500), and 6 events at the institution level (threshold of 2000).
Ultimately, 5 events resulted in alerts at the IP level (threshold of 2500). Any
change value greater than 2500 at the IP granularity was alerted.
The alerts at the IP granularity level correspond to the increases in botnet activity
seen in Figure 1.6. RED Alert identified the host responsible for the major spike
seen around 9:00 in Figure 1.6. The detected IP address, which indeed was
labeled as a botnet, went from no requests at 9:06 to over 5,000 requests at
9:07. Additionally, the IP identified at the spike around 15:00 was a group of
botnets that increased activity from 0 requests at 14:59 to over 3,000 requests at
15:00. RED Alert was able to detect these events at the country granularity level
and successfully track them to the offending hosts at the IP granularity level. The
spike at 10:00 was traced down to the final granularity level, but was not alerted
as it did exceed the threshold.
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Figure 3.8: RED Alert Botnet, Country Granularity

Figure 3.9: RED Alert Botnet, City Granularity

Figure 3.10: RED Alert Botnet, Institution Granularity
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Figure 3.11: RED Alert Botnet, IP Granularity

3.2.3 Choosing Threshold Values
In both the botnet detection and packet loss examples, a periodic noise can be
seen in the data with a total change value around 1000 for the botnet example
and 3000 for the packet loss example. This noise represents the normal “hum” of
the network traffic from users connecting and disconnecting, or the change in
packet loss in the network for each time window. Thus, it is important that the first
threshold for spawning the recursive search of RED Alert is at least this normal
“hum” value (leading to the initial thresholds of 1000 and 3000 in our results).
This way, any activity that is outside of this range would be explored through the
remaining steps of RED Alert. The other threshold values should scale according
to the user’s desires. It is up to the user to determine which threshold values
provide the most meaning in the context of their network, so some trial and error
with the threshold values is necessary to properly utilize RED Alert.
As seen in the botnet example in Figure 3.11, three events were not alerted at
the final granularity level. This was due to the threshold chosen. If the threshold
was lowered at a coarser granularity, the events would have been tracked down
to the IP granularity level and alerted on. However, the threshold was set to
detect the larger spikes at 9:00 and 15:00 and thus did not consider the other
anomalous events at 12:15, 13:15, and 16:00.

30

3.2.4 Effects of Time Window
As is important with any machine learning algorithm, finding the best value for
parameters is key to an algorithm’s success. RED Alert has two main types of
parameters, the time window and the thresholds. As just described, the
thresholds are more of a user-configurable parameter for what is being detected.
On the other hand, the time window could have drastic results on the detection in
the algorithm. Too small of a time window could cause a large amount of noise
being detected in the data whereas too large of a time window could lead to
events being undetected when they are washed out by other noise.
RED Alert was run using varying time windows for the detections shown
previously, focusing on the effects of the country level detection as it is what
ultimately leads to the recursive event detection. As shown earlier, a time window
of 1-minute provided meaningful and conclusive results. At the 10-second time
window seen in Figures 3.12 and 3.14, the data is noisy, but still detects the
spikes in packet loss for the network and the spikes in botnet activity. From a
data analytics perspective, this time window performs well, but is a bit more
visually unpleasing than the 1-minute time window. The periodic noise seen here
is a bit more noticeable than in the 1-minute time window.
When using a 5-minute, shown in Figures 3.13 and 3.15, the plots fail to indicate
some activity that was evident in the 1-minute and 10-second time windows. For
example, in Figure 3.15, anomalous activity from 15:00 to 16:00 is washed out
when using the 5-minute window, but not in the 1-minute and 10-second
windows. This is because when looking at the larger time window of 5-minutes,
the change may not be as drastic since more values are being aggregated even
though the same slice may be detected as the most changed. For example, in
the botnet detection, Russia was alerted as the most changed slice at the country
level at 15:00. However, in the 5-minute time window, Russia increased from
23,400 requests at 14:55 to 24,700 at 15:00. Even though this was the most
changed slice, the total change is only 1300, much lower than the orders of
10,000 typically calculated for the total change for this time-window. At the 1minute scale, Russia increased from 2500 requests at 14:59 to 10,000 requests
at 15:00. This caused the total change value to be about 7500 and noticeable in
the 1-minute plots. Although the label of the most changed slice does not tend to
change between different time windows, the value calculated for larger time
windows may not be as meaningful when plotted.
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Figure 3.12: 10-second Time Window, Packet Loss Detection

Figure 3.13: 5-minute Time Window, Packet Loss Detection

Figure 3.14: 10-second Time Window, Botnet Detection
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Figure 3.15: 5-minute Time Window, Botnet Detection

Another key importance about selecting the time window is the effect on
computation time. With an increase in the time window, tensors will be larger due
to the increase in the number of data points. Since RED Alert processing time
scales linearly with respect to the number of non-zero values, an increase in data
size leads to an increase in the execution time of the program. For example, for
the packet loss detection, RED Alert takes about 50 minutes total for the 10second time window, about 56 minutes for the 1-minute time window, and about
74 minutes for the 5-minute time window. Likewise, RED Alert takes about 36
minutes total for the 10-second time window, 37 minutes for the 1-minute time
window, and about 57 minutes for the 5-minute time window in the botnet
detection. Thus, there is a tradeoff with selecting the appropriate time window
that works well for the data and also does not cause tremendous increases in
execution time.

3.2.5 Robustness
To test the robustness of RED Alert, RED Alert was run on a month of data to
see if the algorithm could handle long stretches of time without crashing and still
properly filter out uninteresting data.
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RED Alert ran through this month of data for both the packet loss example and
botnet detection example. The dataset consisted of a total of over 590 million
records. In the packet loss example, thresholds of 3000, 3500, 4000 and 5000
respectively for each of the granularity levels were used again as they provided
conclusive results in the previous example. From this, a total of 6371 events was
alerted at the country level, 980 events at the city level, 276 events at the
institution level, and finally, 229 events were deemed anomalous at the IP
granularity level.
For the botnet example, the same thresholds were used of 1000, 1500, 2000 and
2500. This led to of 13,500 events alerted at the country level, 293 events at the
city level, 179 events at the institution level, and 173 events at the IP granularity
level. Processing this month of data took about 3600 minutes (2.5 days) for the
packet loss example and 4900 minutes (3.5 days) minutes for the botnet
detection example. This shows that RED Alert is able to keep up with large
amounts of data in “faster than real-time” allowing for quick response when used
on real-time network data.
One potential limitation to using these constant thresholds is the changes in
network behavior through days of the week. Network traffic on a weekend is
much less active than network traffic on a weekday, so it would make sense to
have varying threshold levels based on the day of the week and time of the year
to provide more accurate detection. Some events on a weekend may be
considered anomalous, but lower than the thresholds used for weekdays. This
would cause some events to go unnoticed. However, using time-varying
thresholding requires extensive understanding of the network behavior through a
large amount of statistic collections and analysis.

3.2.6 Using Energy as Criteria
Total change was one evaluation criteria explored for detection through RED
Alert. Another value RED Alert used was the energy metric explained in the
introduction. For this, slices with the most energy were detected and alerted in
the algorithm using thresholds based on slice energy. With respect to the RED
Alert algorithm shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, nothing in regards to the
algorithm’s process change besides calculating the energy of each slice rather
than the total change. The algorithm merely detects the slice with the most
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energy, alerting on energy-defined thresholds. Since values are squared in the
energy calculations, larger values for thresholds are necessary.
For the packet loss example shown in Figures 3.16 - 3.19, using energy as the
threshold criteria led to conclusive results. From Figure 3.16 at the country
granularity level, an energy threshold of 1,000,000 led to 130 events being
detected. At the city granularity in Figure 3.17, a threshold of 20,000,000 led to 8
events being detected. Then using a threshold of 40,000,000 at the institution
granularity level led to 6 events continuing on to the IP granularity level (Figure
3.18). Finally, as displayed in Figure 3.19, a threshold of 160,000,000 led to 5
events being alerted as anomalous at the IP granularity level. RED Alert still
alerted with the IP addresses leading to the events detected at this level. These
final 5 alerts corresponded to the same IP addresses as the ones alerted in the
total change example discussed previously.
With reference to the plots in Figures 3.20 – 3.23, RED Alert was also successful
in its detection of botnets using the energy criteria. The threshold values used
here were much smaller than the ones in the packet loss example, but still larger
than the thresholds from the total change example. For the country granularity
level in Figure 3.20, a threshold of 150,000 resulted in 76 events detected. These
events were filtered down to 26 events at the city granularity level from a
threshold of 600,000, shown in Figure 3.21. At the institution level, a much larger
threshold of 3,500,000 was needed to filter these events to the 7 events seen in
Figure 3.22. Finally, in Figure 3.23, a threshold of 9,700,000 was used to alert on
6 IP addresses. 5 of the IP addresses alerted at the final level corresponded to
the same IP addresses detected from total change. The sixth IP address
corresponds to the event that was detected around 16:20 that was overlooked
when using total change. This is because energy is an L2-norm, so the change
values will increase more drastically and can be detected with lower thresholds.
The lack of detection for the botnet at event at 12:15 is due to a botnet that was
already active becoming more active, and the event at 13:15 is undetected due
to a botnet becoming gradually more active over time. RED Alert is only sensitive
to sudden changes in the network as opposed to gradual changes.
Using energy takes slightly more time than using total change due to the extra
calculations in calculating and squaring the norm of the slices. RED Alert took
about 56 minutes for the packet loss example using total change and 60 minutes
using energy. Similarly, using total change took 37 minutes for the botnet
detection, but total energy took 46 minutes. These differences become starker
when used on longer periods of time and larger networks.
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Figure 3.16: RED Alert Packet Loss using Energy, IP Granularity

Figure 3.17: RED Alert Packet Loss using Energy, City Granularity

Figure 3.18: RED Alert Packet Loss using Energy, Institution Granularity
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Figure 3.19: RED Alert Packet Loss using Energy, IP Granularity

Figure 3.20: RED Alert Botnet using Energy, Country Granularity

Figure 3.21: RED Alert Botnet using Energy, City Granularity
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Figure 3.22: RED Alert Botnet using Energy, Institution Granularity

Figure 3.23: RED Alert Botnet using Energy, IP Granularity
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4. MODELING RESULTS WITH INSIGHT2
InSight2 is a network monitoring system developed at the University of
Tennessee to provide a platform for data analytics and visualization of largescale network data. In this chapter, the history, motivation and current
architecture of InSight2 is outlined as well as how RED Alert interacts with the
platform.

4.1 History and Motivation of InSight2
InSight2 serves as a continuation of the GLORIAD InSight project developed in
2013. InSight solely monitored the GLORIAD research and education network
described below, but InSight2 serves as a generic, open framework capable of
providing analytics for any network. This section explains the transition from
InSight to InSight2.

4.1.1 GLORIAD and InSight
Due to the sheer size of GLORIAD and the data associated with it, InSight was
created in 2013 as a network monitoring tool to ensure high performance and
security in the international network [19]. Its focus was to provide in-depth
analyses on network flow data such as jitter, packet loss, and various security
measurements.
However, in 2014, GLORIAD ended and with it came the termination of InSight.
InSight’s dependencies changed and updated after InSight’s termination causing
it to be useless. Updating the original code base of InSight seemed to be near
impossible due to the complex components with little documentation and no
modularity. Additionally, it was unclear as to what types of database backends
were used to host the GLORIAD data for display. For these reasons,
modernizing InSight would require much more work than anticipated. From NSF
sponsorship under the project “The InSight Advanced Performance
Measurement System” with sponsorship from IRNC-AMI (International Research
Network Connections - Advanced Measurement Network Infrastructure) program,
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development for a completely new InSight platform (aptly named InSight2)
began.

4.1.2 From InSight to InSight2
InSight2 is a complete redesign from the original InSight framework [1]. InSight2
strived to have the modularity and cohesiveness that InSight lacked in a modern
framework with less moving parts. The goals of InSight2 remained the same as
those of InSight – providing a large-scale network visualization tool that allows for
network operators to quickly determine the health of their system. Moreover,
InSight2 was developed with extendibility in mind so that users can define their
own dashboard interfaces and provide their own data to be used with the tool. All
tools and databases used in the framework are free or open-source so that
InSight2 can be shared with anyone without licensing issues.
InSight2 consisted of some notable changes from the original InSight. The first
change was to use a Python code base rather than Perl. Python is a very robust
and user-friendly language that would easily allow for extensions to the platform
without rewrites in the code base. Although Python is a scripting language, it
contains object-oriented design mechanisms that allow for modularity in software
design. Moreover, InSight2 used Elasticsearch [20] as the sole data storage
database. Python has libraries that interact directly with Elasticsearch databases
(elasticsearch-py and elasticsearch-dsl-py) allowing for quick and easy upload
and retrieval of data stored in the database. Another useful component of having
Elasticsearch access is the ability to create visualizations of the data within the
same framework with Kibana. Kibana users can access the various indices within
Elasticsearch and create a variety of different visualizations of the data.
Examples of highly used visualizations are area plots, line plots, heat maps, and
bar graphs among many others. Kibana also has the ability to aggregate multiple
visualizations together to create dashboards. Using these Kibana dashboards
and an HTML frontend, the InSight2 visualization platform can be seen anywhere
from the web. This differs from the original InSight in that multiple different
database types (MySQL, SQLite, and Elasticsearch) were aggregated with a
customized Kibana front-end for display. The InSight2 method is much more
compartmentalized with only the Elasticsearch and Kibana interaction.
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Some components from InSight stayed the same due to their performance. Argus
was kept as the network flow aggregating tool since it is versatile and fast,
supporting the collection of up to 127 different fields for each flow. Currently,
work is underway to support other network flow aggregators such as NetFlow.
Additionally, the majority of the dashboards were kept the same since the
dashboards used in InSight provided meaningful displays in regards to the health
of the network. In the next section, the changes made are described in detail.

4.2 Architecture Overview
The InSight2 architecture was developed with simplicity and modularity in mind
[21]. Each component of the design is independently developed and maintained
so that add-ons and changes can be made to the design without disrupting the
flow of InSight2. These modules work synchronously together to provide a better
user experience as well as having more efficient disk usage. The main modules
are the Enrichment Module (EM), Updater Module (UM), Summarizer Module
(SM), and user-defined plug-ins. These modules are described below as well as
how they work together in the InSight2 framework.

4.2.1 Enrichment Module
The Enrichment Module (EM) serves as the core component in InSight2. Its
purpose is to collect the output from the Argus flow data and provide further
metadata from other database sources. The EM then uploads the aggregated
data to the Elasticsearch database. The EM works both for archived flow data,
such as the GLORIAD data, or can be used on live streaming data. The
database sources used to provide further metadata are described below. The
Global Science Registry and MaxMind GeoIP databases are the ones used for
RED Alert’s granularity levels.
Global Science Registry (GSR): The Global Science Registry is a SQL
database from the original InSight that is uploaded to Elasticsearch. The GSR is
composed of tags for over 14,000 different institutions that used GLORIAD. For
InSight2, GSR is used to collect information about each unique IP address’s
domain name server (DNS) information, the labels for each IP node, the IP
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name, the address to domain ID matching, location information, autonomous
system (AS) numbers, the IP address’s ISP name, and the organization the IP
belongs to. Since this database is so large, it is stored in its own index in the
Elasticsearch database to provide quick access and searching.
MaxMind GeoIP: MaxMind’s GeoIP database contains information about IP
address locations. The location data varies in granularity level including
information about the IP’s city, province, zip code, country, latitude and longitude.
Using the Python module pygeoip, IP addresses are quickly tagged with the
appropriate geolocation data. The GeoIP database is stored on disk since it is
implemented using the Python library.
Threats Databases (TD): Various online databases listing malicious IP
addresses are aggregated into the Threats Database (TD) upon InSight2’s
creation to tag potential suspicious activity in the network. The TD contains
information on emerging threats, CYMRU Bogons, and IP addresses belonging
to the Zeus, Feodo, Palevo, and Spyeye botnets. Using the Updater Module
described in the next section, these threat databases are guaranteed to be up-todate and contain the most recent lists of malicious IP addresses. This database
is also stored in Elasticsearch to provide quick searching and tagging of
malicious IP addresses.
The EM is parallelized to provide quick collection and upload of flow data by
distributing the enrichment across all available cores. This is done by using
Python’s multiprocessing library and splitting the data into chunks to be
processed and uploaded individually by each core. Each core has its own thread
from the main program with each thread processing one flow record at a time.
Race conditions are avoided using the multiprocessing Manager class in Python
that provides shared data types across threads. This ensures that two threads do
not try to index to the same point in Elasticsearch and cause overwrites.
Moreover, these threads are lightweight, containing only the necessary values
needed for enrichment – the data to be enriched, access to the Elasticsearch
database, access to the enrichment databases, and other small data types such
as verbose flags and file names.
The EM works as follows. The first step in the enrichment is to spawn off the
Argus client. Using the subprocess Python module, an Argus thread is started to
pipe flow data into the EM. If archived data is used, the data is broken up into
smaller sets so that the Argus call does not hold up the enrichment. If live data is
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used, the output buffer from Argus is read every few seconds to gather any new
flow data that has appeared. The flow data typically amounts to a large quantity
of records since the records are stored by milliseconds. When the Argus call
finishes (or when the live stream buffer is read), the resulting flow data is
chunked into smaller pieces to begin the parallelized parsing of the flow data for
further enrichment. This parsing works by accessing the various fields returned
by Argus and adding them to a Python dictionary for temporary storage. Checks
are made to ensure that no data fields are left empty or of the wrong data type. If
a field is left empty, a default value is used. Using the source and destination IP
address fields, information from the previously mentioned databases are
aggregated as well and added to the dictionary. Once all fields have been added
to the dictionary, it is converted to a JSON object for upload to the Elasticsearch
database within the appropriate index. Once a thread finishes parsing and
uploading its data, it joins back to the main thread and is given a new set of data
to parse.

4.2.2 Updater and Summarizer Modules
The EM is useful for uploading the data to the Elasticsearch database, but it is
important to ensure that the data in the database is up to date and aggregable.
This is the motivation for the Updater Module (UM) and Summarizer Module
(SM). The UM is used to periodically check for updates in the databases used in
the EM to see if any new information is available. The SM is able to “summarize”
data in longer time periods than the millisecond granularity used in the EM. Both
of these modules are described in this section.
Updater Module: The UM ensures up-to-date enrichment databases by polling
the sources of each database periodically. If a database changed in the past time
period, the UM deletes the old database from Elasticsearch and uploads the
more modern one in its place. The UM is run as a background daemon with
logging capabilities to log changes to the databases and alert the user if
problems with the module arise. This time period is configurable by the user, and
each database can be individually configured to be checked at different time
intervals. Examples of information updated through the UM include newly
discovered botnet IP addresses and organizational labels for IP addresses.
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Summarizer Module: From the EM, data is collected at the time granularity of
milliseconds. In some instances, this granularity is too fine for network operators.
The SM is designed to fix this issue by summarizing numerical data in larger time
windows such as minute-to-minute scale. The SM summarizes data in the
following ways. Source and destination IP addresses are summarized by using
least specific subnet prefixes. Number of bytes and packet counts are individually
summed. Jitter and inter-packet arrival times are individually averaged per time
window. This allows for a quick snapshot of what the network traffic looks like at
a specific time without using the large data at such a fine granularity.

4.2.3 Plug-ins
The dashboards generated by InSight2 only provide information about the raw
data collected in the EM. For proper data analysis, intelligent algorithms are
useful to provide further insight as to underlying trends in the data. Plug-ins are
user-created modules that have access to the InSight2 Elasticsearch database to
collect flow data and provide more informative network analytics. Plug-ins are
designed to work by accessing the Elasticsearch database to quickly obtain the
dataset, perform some sort of analytics, and upload the resulting data to a new
Elasticsearch index. The resulting data in the new index can then be visualized in
a Plug-in dashboard with the visualization design suited for the analysis. Since
InSight2 uses an Elasticsearch backend, users can develop Plug-ins in their
programming language of choice to interact with the database. Currently,
Elasticsearch has APIs in Java, Javascript, Perl, Python, PHP, and Ruby.
Despite InSight2’s internal development in Python, any of these languages can
be used to create Plug-ins. Examples of Plug-ins developed already are Markov
chain analysis and RED Alert.

4.2.4 Dashboards
As briefly mentioned earlier, dashboards are the ways in which the data created
by these different modules are visualized. The dashboards used in InSight2 were
inspired by the dashboard interface from the original InSight, but with a
modernized interface. Dashboards group related visualizations together,
separating each dashboard in different tabs on the InSight2 webpage. These
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dashboards are iFrames from Kibana stored in an HTML file for display on the
web. This means that any browser with Javascript capabilities can load the
dashboards for viewing from any location. The three main dashboards are the
overview dashboard, the performance dashboard, and the connections
dashboard. As mentioned in the previous section, additional dashboards may be
created for plug-in modules.

4.2.5 InSight2 Workflow
InSight2 has modularized the framework, so it is important that the individual
components interact in a cohesive fashion to provide a reliable and efficient
system. Each module works independently such that a problem in one module
does not disrupt the process of the overall framework. Additionally, as modules
are added or removed in potential future updates, the whole framework does not
need to be redesigned as it is robust to changes.
The workflow for the InSight2 framework proceeds as follow. The EM is spawned
to collect the Argus flow data and upload the enriched data to Elasticsearch.
From the EM, each additional Plug-in is started to collect the data from
Elasticsearch and perform their analyses. The EM periodically checks that each
Plug-in is still running and not using too much computational power. The results
of the Plug-ins are uploaded back to Elasticsearch and stored there. Separately,
the UM and SM interact with Elasticsearch. The UM daemon is inactive for most
of the time and updates the enrichment databases when needed. The SM
periodically accesses the Elasticsearch database and summarizes data,
uploading the summarized data back to Elasticsearch in a new index. Using a
webserver with embedded Kibana visualizations, the various dashboards are
visible to network operators. The Kibana visualizations are built on top of
Elasticsearch which allows for direct access to create visualizations without the
need for a middleman. Figure 4.1 displays a diagram depicting the workflow for
InSight2 and how each module interacts with one another.
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Figure 4.1: InSight2 Architecture Workflow

4.3 Tensor InSight2 Framework
InSight2 is designed for large-scale networks, so the data aggregated from the
platform is large in volume. The dimensionality of the tensors can reach several
thousands of indices per mode. The tensors are also quite sparse due to the
nature of the data. Thus, an efficient method for storing and accessing large
sparse tensors is necessary for tensor analyses. In this section, Python libraries
for tensor computations are surveyed and analyzed. Then, the implementation
used for the RED Alert plug-in is described.

4.3.1 Overview of Python Tensor Libraries
Since the development of InSight2 consisted of using the Elasticsearch APIs in
Python, the RED Alert plug-in was designed in a Python framework. However,
Python has limited resources for tensor development. Many libraries exist for the
creation and processing of high-dimensional data, but many lack key
functionalities or documentation for proper use. This section summarizes some of
the tensor libraries tested for RED Alert’s InSight2 plug-in.
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NumPy and SciPy: NumPy [22] is perhaps the most popular Python multidimensional computation framework. The library is part of the SciPy numerical
computation library in Python. NumPy is a lightweight library contain only the
necessary tools to create and manage multi-dimensional objects with some
computational tools, whereas SciPy contains much more computational
packages such as statistics and linear algebra tools wrapped around BLAS and
LAPACK frameworks. These libraries are often compared to MATLAB due to the
similar uses and capabilities between the two.
NumPy is popular due to its easy and efficient use of n-dimensional arrays.
Python lists can easily be converted to NumPy arrays by using simple calls to the
library. Retrieval, filtering, and searching of data in these arrays is fast as well.
NumPy even contains functions for addition, subtraction, dot product, division,
inverse, and many other useful math tools for their n-dimensional arrays so that
the user does not have to iterate over the entire structure to compute some
result.
The fact that NumPy supports an arbitrary number of dimensions seems to
suggest that it could be used easily as the tensor framework for RED Alert, but
there are some notable limitations to using NumPy as a tensor framework. For
instance, modifying the multi-dimension data such as appending rows or columns
and adding dimensions is extremely slow in NumPy. Network data is dynamic
and may require deletions and additions to the tensors, so quick tensor
manipulation is essential for robust computation. Additionally, as mentioned
earlier, network flow data in a tensor framework is quite sparse. The data can
grow very large at times and exceed Python memory capacities. Thus, some sort
of sparse tensor compression is necessary for our analyses. NumPy itself does
not support any sort of compression and requires all data to be stored in RAM at
a given time. This solution will not work for all of our data. Although SciPy does
contain support for sparse matrix representations, it does not extend to ndimensional data objects as needed in our algorithm.
TensorLy: TensorLy [23] is a Python library designed for tensor storage and
computation with minimal dependencies. It contains not only support for tensor
storage and manipulation such as accessing sub-tensors and slices, but it also
comes with high-end tensor computations such as tensor decompositions and
regressions. TensorLy supports three different Python libraries as its internal
backends for storage, NumPy, PyTorch and MXNet. PyTorch and MXNet are
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both large-scale deep learning frameworks that are capable of GPU usage that
contain n-dimensional data objects as NumPy does.
TensorLy seems to have most of the functionality necessary for RED Alert.
Though, as of late 2017 when this tensor analysis work began, no support for
sparse tensors existed for TensorLy (the authors mentioned it was on their
roadmap for the future). Once again, the memory problems of NumPy and SciPy
arose again where large tensors could not be stored in RAM when using Python.
As mentioned, TensorLy does support high performance backends that support
GPU use, but since RED Alert was designed for generic computational
frameworks without GPU support, these backends were not an option. TensorLy
may be revisited in future work once sparse tensor support is released.
scikit-tensor: Scikit-tensor [24] is a Python library built on top of SciPy and
NumPy to provide tensor support through multilinear algebra and tensor
factorization functions. Some of the same high-end functions from TensorLy were
available in scikit-tensor as well. More importantly though, scikit-tensor consisted
of support for both sparse and dense tensors. For dense tensors, scikit-tensor
used the NumPy n-dimensional arrays. For sparse tensors, scikit-tensor used the
Coordinate format (COO) from SciPy that stores only non-zero data.
COO works as follows. n different lists representing the n dimensions hold the
coordinates of the various non-zero values. For a tensor of 3 modes, the
coordinates (i, j, k) would be split into three different lists all at the same index.
Another list is stored that holds the non-zero values in the sparse data structure.
If there are m non-zero values in the sparse data structure, each of these n+1
lists would contain m values.
For example, consider a sparse matrix (tensor of two modes). The COO
representation of this matrix would contain a list for the rows with non-zero
values and a list with the corresponding columns with non-zero values. The COO
representation would then consist of a third list containing these non-zero values.
Thus, the i th non-zero value, stored in data[ i ] would be located at (rows[ i ],
columns[ i ]) in the matrix. Figure 4.2 shows a depiction of COO for a matrix of
dimensions 3 × 2.
Even though Scikit-tensor contained the functionalities needed for RED Alert, the
documentation was scarce and difficult to find, and the project had not been
updated in almost 2 years.
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Figure 4.2: COO Representation

4.3.2 Modifications to scikit-tensor
Since scikit-tensor contained the core functionalities necessary for our tensor
processing, the library was selected as the basis for our toolkit with some
modifications to fully meet the requirements of our algorithm. Scikit-tensor lacked
functionality in accessing only subsections of the tensor such as slices and subtensors. Consequently, the four following functions were added to scikit-tensor
for use in our tensor toolkit:

•

slice(mode, i): Return the list of non-zero values at slice i in mode mode.

•

slice_toarray(mode, i): Return the entire slice as an n-dimensional NumPy
array at slice i in mode mode including the zero values.

•

delete(mode, i): Delete the non-zero values in the slice i of mode mode.

•

subtensor_toarray(mode, begin, end): Return the subtensor as a NumPy
array from slice begin to slice end in mode mode.
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These additional functions provided easy access to subsets of the tensors
without having to expand the entire tensor and running into memory issues as
was required in the original scikit-tensor library. Using these functions, tensors
could also be quickly resized and modified which was slow in NumPy. The code
for the tensor library used in RED Alert can be seen at
https://www.github.com/jtliso/scikit-tensor.

4.3.3 Interaction with Elasticsearch
As a plug-in for InSight2, functionality was needed to interact with the
Elasticsearch backend to create the tensors and perform the analyses. Using the
elasticsearch-py library, the InSight2 database could be queried to collect data.
Tensors are built from an n-tuple of data gathered from Elasticsearch. These ntuples consisted of (n-1) parameters (e.g., time, source information, destination
information, protocol, etc.) and a value (e.g., packets, number of connections,
bytes, etc.) as the n th item in the tuple. This corresponds to a tensor of n-1
modes with each mode corresponding to one of the n-1 parameters collected
from Elasticsearch. The user needs to specify a time range of data to collect, the
parameters of RED Alert (time window and thresholds) and the value to be
collected within the tensor. Figure 4.4 depicts a tensor of mode 3 collected using
the 4-tuple (time, source country, destination country, number of connections).
Spikes in the tensor represent values at each cell in the tensor.
The tensors are built in the following way. A query to Elasticsearch is sent using
the Search API from elasticsearch-py. For longer time ranges (greater than 1
hour), the searches are broken into one-hour chunks to prevent stress on the
Elasticsearch server and preserve RAM. These searches are sorted by the n-1
dimensions that are passed using Elasticsearch’s Sort API. This guarantees that
tuples containing the same n-1 parameters will be returned in succession. This is
important for creating the tensor in COO format as explained later in this section.
The n th entry in the n-tuple represents the value, and this value is stored in a list
of these values from Elasticsearch. This works well with the COO format since it
only needs to store the non-zero values (i.e., any value obtained from
Elasticsearch). By appending the value with the appending of the n-1 indices,
COO format is maintained by having the i th value correspond to the i th indices.
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Figure 4.3: InSight2 Sample Tensor

As mentioned earlier in this section, these Elasticsearch results are sorted by the
parameters passed by the user. This means it is possible to sum the values
returned from the search until a new tuple is returned from the query. For
example, in building a tensor of time × source IP address × destination IP
address with number of connections as the value, the number of connections
between a specific source IP to destination IP can be summed until a new tuple
is reached before appending it to the non-zero value list. This prevents look-up in
the n different lists to determine which value needs to be incremented when a
repeated tensor entry is seen.
Once the searches in the specified time range have been completed, the scikittensor model is ready to be created. The index list, the non-zero value list, and
the shape (which is determined by the number of unique parameters per mode)
are stored in a class, creating the sparse tensor representation.
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4.4 RED Alert Plug-in within InSight2
As one of the premiere plug-ins of InSight2, RED Alert needed to be ported to
work with the InSight2 framework. This means that RED Alert must be able to be
initialized from an InSight2 dashboard and provide visualizations back to the user
on this dashboard. Kibana has no functionality of starting an outside script from a
dashboard, so a non-Kibana dashboard was needed. Kibana also prevents the
development of third-party dashboards within their web application, so this
required some engineering to work around their limited dashboard features.
Thus, the Python library Flask [25] was used to develop the application side of
the RED Alert plug-in. This allows for RED Alert script initialization from the
InSight2 user and display the results of RED Alert through Kibana visualizations.
Flask is an open-source library in Python that provides server management for
web applications. Users create a Flask-based HTML file that interacts with the
Flask server management through a Python file. Flask is well-documented with a
large userbase allowing for flexible development for any Python project. Since
InSight2 and RED Alert were both built in Python frameworks, it made sense to
use Flask to create the plug-in using RED Alert. This section summarizes the
development of the Flask application created for RED Alert in the context of
InSight2.

4.4.1 Frontend
The RED Alert plug-in can be seen in Figure 4.4. The plug-in features a form to
enter in the parameters used in RED Alert (date from, date to, time window,
thresholds, additional dimensions and tensor value) with a “Refresh” button and a
“RED Alert” button. The “Refresh” button refreshes the plots to match the date
range specified by the user, and the “RED Alert” button spawns the RED Alert
algorithm for the provided parameters. The backend workings of these buttons
and the interactions with the RED Alert script are explained in more detail in the
next section.
Below the form contains the plots generated for the RED Alert data using Kibana.
Since Kibana does not allow for direct manipulation of their dashboards, the
iFrame of the RED Alert visualization dashboard is stored in the application’s
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HTML file to display the plots. Three different plots were used in this dashboard
to aid in the visualization of RED Alert’s results. The example below shows the
packet loss detection example discussed throughout this thesis. The first plot in
the dashboard shows a bar plot with positive and negative values. This displays
the “change of the change” through the use of Kibana’s difference plot. A positive
bar indicates a sudden increase in the change from the previous window (an
alert) and the negative bars indicate the “cancelling” of an alert, meaning the
network has returned back to normal behavior. The second plot is a line plot of
the overall health of the network representing the total change at a given
timestamp. Large increases and decreases in this plot correspond to the positive
or negative spikes seen in the difference plot above it. Finally, the third “plot” in
the dashboard is a table listing the values that were alerted in RED Alert. This
table lists the label of the alerted field, the mode that the alert occurred in and the
count for how many times it occurred in a time window (shown is a 5-minute time
window). This way, the network operator can search on these terms in the
Elasticsearch database to gather more information about the root cause and
outcome of the alert.

4.4.2 Backend
The backend of the RED Alert plug-in works as follows. The plug-in consists of
only one page at the root directory of the application. From there, the Flask app
handles both GET requests and POST requests to this page. The GET requests
handles reloading the page and fetching the iFrame from Kibana with a default
time range. To change the date range of the visualized data in the plug-in, a
POST request is committed through the “Refresh” button shown in Figure 4.4.
This POST request first ensures that a valid date from and date to are provided
by the user. Then the POST request reads the values of the date from and date
to fields to re-fetch the iFrame from Kibana that displays the tensor dashboard.
This is done through URL manipulation of the iFrame. The Kibana iFrame value
contains the date from and date to values within the string. Using a regular
expression, the date fields in this string are updated to match Kibana’s pattern
with the valid dates. Once this URL has been modified correctly, the URL for the
iFrame is then passed to the HTML file that overlays the iFrame. Flask allows for
static variables in HTML files that can be passed through functions in a Python
file, so updating this iFrame string in the HTML file is simple.
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Figure 4.4: RED Alert Plug-in
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Other than the “Refresh” button to change the date range, the plug-in form also
contains a “RED Alert” button that is used to spawn the RED Alert algorithm. This
is also done through a POST request, but in this case more validation and
processes must be completed than in the “Refresh” case. Not only do the date
range fields need to be validated and stored from the POST request, but also the
other fields necessary for RED Alert must be collected as well. The user must
input a valid integer time window greater than 0. Additionally, the user must
provide the desired threshold for each of the granularity levels. The selection of
other dimensions besides source, destination and timestamp are also included
since exploration of higher dimensionality is currently being looked into. Finally,
the user needs to indicate whether to use number of connections (botnet
detection) or total packets lost (packet loss detection) within the tensor being
used in RED Alert. Once the user inputs these values, pressing the “RED Alert”
button spawns a POST request to validate these input values and spawn the
RED Alert process. If a value is missing or invalid, the Flask application returns a
meaningful error message pointing the user to the issue.
After the POST request is completed, the RED Alert process is started as a new
process from the Flask application so that the page can be reloaded while the
algorithm is running. This allows for the user to periodically refresh the iFrame
with the “Refresh” button to see the results of RED Alert uploaded and displayed
in real-time. The RED Alert script uploads the results from each time tick back to
Elasitcsearch so that the data can be visualized through Kibana. This process
allows for the user to have no coding knowledge as the backend handles all of
the parameter passing and checking to execute the script. The user needs to
navigate to the RED Alert plug-in page and enter the desired parameters for
proper functionality.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Analyzing network trends is an important aspect of network operator’s
responsibilites. Creating ways to extract and process network flow data in
meaningful ways is a challenge due to the volume and high-dimensionality of the
data. In this thesis, two main algorithms that use tensors as a means to process
and analyze large-scale network traffic were explored. Network data from the
GLORIAD provided the means for the analyses.
Using DenseAlert as a network monitoring tool proved to be problematic in large,
finely defined tensors. The algorithm begins to report unhelpful results as the
datasets become larger. Specifically, DenseAlert failed to provide any meaningful
results from datasets representing IP network traffic, although smaller tensors of
lower granularity led to more conclusive results. Since IP is the level of traffic that
provides the most meaning to network operators, it is important that a network
monitoring algorithm provides conclusive results on these datasets. Even though
DenseAlert provides quick processing through its re-ordering and update
strategies, its shortcomings can be seen through these results.
Thus, RED Alert was created as a tensor-based monitoring tool for network traffic
to provide means of anomaly detection at any level of granularity. RED Alert
offers a useful alternative to DenseAlert by exploiting the hierarchical nature of
network data, filtering out unimportant data and exploring interesting events in
more detail. It is a simple, but effective algorithm for recursively filtering and
expanding sparse tensors representing time-varying network flow data. We have
provided empirical evidence that the algorithm is able to detect and track the
modeled activity and attribute the changes to host IPs. This is shown through
detection of increases in packet loss and detection of high botnet activity for a
network. Through the use of change magnitude, RED Alert can be used on a
wide variety of data to provide real-time event detection, be that for interesting
benign or critical malicious events. RED Alert also used the idea of slice energy
to show that other tensor metrics can be used to monitor the behavior of the
network. Both total change and energy provide conclusive results with detailed
alerts from the data. RED Alert was shown to be robust in its performance,
processing a month of data in merely a few days. RED Alert can further be
extended to other problems that have multi-dimensional data that can be
separated in a hierarchical fashion.
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Although the steps of RED Alert’s algorithm are easy and straightforward,
creating or implementing tensor libraries in Python proved to be cumbersome.
Python provides numerical processing libraries through SciPy and NumPy, but
these libraries require extensive memory that becomes problematic when dealing
with large, sparse tensors. SciPy and NumPy are useful for their computational
capabilities through their wide variety of linear algebra functions, but they are not
designed for large multi-dimensional storage. This requires the use of third-party
libraries that provide more efficient tensor processing. However, most libraries
lacked the functionality desired at the time. As the DenseAlert creators had to do,
we created a tensor library that fit the needs of RED Alert through modifications
to scikit-tensor, a third-party tensor library on GitHub.
This work ties into the large overall project of InSight2, a network monitoring
platform developed here at the University of Tennessee. The tensor library used
was modified to work in the context of this platform, so that RED Alert could
effectively access and process the data. RED Alert was built as an additional
plug-in to InSight2 using Flask to allow for the execution of the algorithm through
its backend management and meaningful displays in the frontend. From this, a
useful tool for tensor-based network performance monitoring has been created
for internal and external use.
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